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A commentary on
Predicting automaticity in exercise
behaviour: the role of perceived
behavioural control, affect, intention,
action planning, and behaviour
by de Bruijn, G.-J., Gardner, B., van Osch,
L., and Sniehotta, F. (2014). Int. J. Behav.
Med. 21, 767–774. doi: 10.1007/s12529-
013-9348-4
Existing models of exercise behavior are
insufficient in predicting outcomes, this
point is shown by the relatively high levels
of unexplained variance in exercise behav-
ior in meta-analyses of social cognitive
theories and models (Chatzisarantis et al.,
2003; Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2009).
Researchers are beginning to recognize the
importance of implicit, automatic pro-
cesses in the prediction of health behav-
iors (Dimmock and Banting, 2009; Keatley
et al., 2012, 2013b). The research by de
Bruijn et al. (2014) is useful for highlight-
ing the importance of automaticity in exer-
cise behavior. We commend the authors
on investigating an important approach to
automaticity and exercise behavior. There
were, however, some points with which we
disagree. We think that the authors do not
provide a clear account of what they mean
by automaticity–an issue that is essential
for the operationalization of the construct.
Bargh (1994), for instance, suggested auto-
maticity has four characteristics: aware-
ness, intention, efficiency, and control; it is
not clear whether de Bruijn and colleagues
automaticity adheres to this. In particu-
lar, we contend that the explicit measure
of automaticity used in their research is
not an optimal way to assess implicit,
impulsive processes. Furthermore, we con-
tend that implicit measures, such as the
implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald
et al., 1998) would be better positioned
as measures of non-conscious processes.
The present commentary focuses on pre-
behavior automatic associations, which we
contend are better assessed by existing
implicit measures, rather than during-
behavior automatic “processes.”
Taking our perspective from existing
implicit theories and models (Strack and
Deutsch, 2004; Levesque et al., 2008), we
suggest that the authors should clearly
outline that their definition of automatic-
ity reflects more conscious processes and
self-reporting. De Bruijn and colleagues’
proposal that automaticity is determined
by the number of times a person has
made a decision and goes through the
processes does not necessarily imply auto-
maticity. The experience of automaticity
in de Bruijn and colleagues’ study is self-
reported and does not necessarily mea-
sure the reality of automaticity; people
may report they do things automatically,
but, in reality a lot of conscious effort
goes into their actions (see Hagger et al.,
2014).
WHAT ARE IMPLICIT PROCESSES?
Given the recent rise in research focusing
on non-conscious, automatic, or implicit
processes, clear definitions of what each
researcher means by their terms is fun-
damental in reducing confusion between
what is meant by each term and how
to measure it (Payne and Gawronski,
2010). The explicit measure used in the
de Bruijn et al.’s study does not appear to
assess implicit or impulsive processes for
either measurement type or psychological
attribute. One way of defining and using
the term “implicit” refers to the assessment
of individuals’ psychological attributes
without the need for explicitly asking peo-
ple (Fazio and Olson, 2003); de Bruijn
and colleagues’ automaticity measure is
not consistent with this definition. Other
researchers have defined automaticity as
constructs or systems that are assessed
by particular types of measures that do
not require explicit, conscious introspec-
tion (Banaji, 2001). Instead, de Bruijn and
colleagues’ measure appears to be some-
thing of a meta-cognitive variable that
reflects participant deliberations on the
extent to which their exercise behavior
is automatic. We suggest that the type
of automaticity de Bruijn and colleagues
referred to may actually be better mea-
sured by existing implicit measures, such
as the IAT.
AUTOMATICITY AS ASSOCIATIONS
de Bruijn et al. outline that “repetition
in stable contexts strengthens associa-
tions between the situational cue and the
behavioural action” (p. 768). While we
fully endorse this interpretation of exist-
ing findings in the literature, we sug-
gest that existing implicit tests would be
a better measure of these associations
(Dimmock and Banting, 2009; Conroy
et al., 2010). Implicit measures provide a
clear indication of whether the associa-
tions between cue and action are influ-
enced by automatic, implicit or delibera-
tive processes. Measures of implicit con-
structs such as the IAT (Greenwald et al.,
1998) or go no-go tasks (Nosek and Banaji,
2001), for example, that measure the speed
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of association between targets and cate-
gories would be more fit-for-purpose to
tap automaticity as it is defined by de
Bruijn and colleagues. Such tests could be
adopted to measure the extent to which
associations between contexts and behav-
iors (e.g., leisure time context and exer-
cise behaviors) are automatic; this could
be used concurrently with the measure
of automaticity used by de Bruijn and
colleagues’ to provide some concurrent
validity.
MEASUREMENT ISSUES
One pertinent issue in research involv-
ing implicit and explicit measures is mea-
surement correspondence. In de Bruijn
and colleagues’ study, it may be that the
explicit measure of automaticity is pre-
dicted by the explicit predictor variables
due to the correspondence of measure-
ment type. The current trend appears
to be that implicit measures better pre-
dict spontaneous outcomes and behav-
iors than planned, self-reported behaviors
(Perugini et al., 2010, 2011). Similarly,
explicit, self-report measures seem better
suited to predicting reflective, self-report
behaviors. In de Bruijn and colleagues
study, even though the explicit mea-
sure of automaticity was measured 2
weeks after the baseline assessment of
past behavior and social cognitive vari-
ables, the study could not exclude the
possibility that common method variance
(Spector, 2006) and semantic similarity
(Arnulf et al., 2014) inflated the asso-
ciations between the study variables. It
is important that future research should
include implicit measures when examining
the relationship between non-conscious
processes and social cognitive variables.
Furthermore, previous research has shown
that objectively-measured behaviors (e.g.,
accelerometer for physical activity, free
choice task for motivation) are better pre-
dicted by implicit measures (Keatley et al.,
2013a). Future research should there-
fore incorporate alternative objectively-
measured outcome variables, which may
be better measured by implicit measures.
However, it should be noted that implicit
measures, such as the IAT, are not process-
pure, they are subject to the influence of
control processes and biases. There are,
however, models (e.g., process dissocia-
tion analyses) that have been developed
to “purify” the measure of automatic
associations (e.g., Payne, 2001).
CONCLUSION
While we support the research conducted
by de Bruijn and colleagues, we contend
that there are limitations in the con-
ceptualization of automaticity and the
results presented. Given the definition
of automaticity outlined by the authors,
existing measure of implicit associations
appear to be better suited to measure
automaticity. We therefore think the
research would be improved by the inclu-
sion of implicit measures. Furthermore,
we encourage future research to include
outcome variables of automaticity that
may be better predicted by related
implicit measures. Finally, researchers
using longitudinal designs should be
mindful to not allow mere measure-
ment effects or measure correspondence
or common method variance to affect
results.
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